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Abstract: Some of my mental states are conscious and some of them are not.
Sometimes I am so focused on the wine in front of me that I am unaware 
that I am thinking about it; but sometimes, of course, I take a reflexive step 
back and become aware of my thinking about the wine in front of me.  What
marks the difference between a conscious mental state and an unconscious 
one? In this paper, I focus on Durand of St.-Pourçain’s rejection of the 
higher-order theory of state consciousness, according to which a mental act 
is conscious when there is another, suitably related, mental (reflex) act that 
exists at the same time with it. Durand rejects such higher-order theories on
the grounds that they violate the thesis that a given mental power can have 
or elicit only one mental act at a given time. I first go over some of Durand’s
general arguments for this thesis. I then turn to Durand’s application of the 
thesis to the issue of state consciousnes and reflex acts. I close by 
considering the objection that Durand’s same-order theory of state 
consciousness makes consciousness ubiquitous.
Durand of St.-Pourçain on Reflex Acts and
State Consciousness.
Some of my mental states are conscious and some of them are not, or, put in
other terms, I am aware of some of my mental states and unaware of others.
Sometimes I am so focused on the wine in front of me that I am unaware 
that I am thinking about it; but sometimes, of course, I take a reflexive step 
back and become aware of my thinking about the wine in front of me. What 
marks the difference between a conscious mental state and an unconscious 
one? For some philosophers, both medieval and contemporary, a mental 
state is conscious when there is another, suitably related, mental state that 
exists at the same time as it. On this account, state consciousness is a 
matter of a higher-order (or reflex) mental state (or act) being present in 
the mind at the same time as a lower-order (or direct) state (or act). Call 
such a theory the higher-order theory. Other philosophers, both medieval 
and contemporary, reject the higher-order theory, endorsing instead a 
same-order theory.1
1 In what follows, I will mostly focus on what is nowadays called 
introspective state consciousness (as with the example given: the explicit 
awareness of a mental state) as opposed to phenomenal state consciousness
(the what it’s like or qualitative feel one has when one is in a certain mental
state, e.g., what it’s like to taste wine). I will return to this distinction in the 
third section. For examples of contemporary higher-order theories, see, 
e.g., David Rosenthal, “Varieties of Higher-Order Theory,” in Higher-Order 
Theories of Consciousness, ed. Gennaro (Amsterdam: John Benjamins, 
2004), PAGEREF; for same-order theories, see, e.g., Uriah Kriegel, “The 
Same-Order Monitoring Theory of Consciousness,” in Self-Representational 
Approaches to Consciousness, ed. Kriegel and Williford (MIT: MIT Press, 
2006), 143–170. For medieval variants, see the taxonomy of views provided 
below in Section 2. Much of the discussion in the secondary literature on 
medieval views focuses on self-consciousness (or subject consciousness) — 
that is, awareness of one’s own self or soul — and not state consciousness —
awareness of one’s own mental states or acts. For a book-length treatment 
of the former, see François-Xavier Putallaz, La connaissance de soi au XIIIe 
siècle (Paris: Vrin, 1991). For the latter, see, however, Christian Rode, 
Zugänge zum Selbst: innere Erfahrung in Spätmittelalter und Früher 
Neuzeit (Münster: Aschendorff, 2015) and Susan Brower-Toland, “Self-
Knowledge, Self-Consciousness, and Reflexivity in Late Medieval 
Philosophy,” in Companion to Cognitive Theory in the Later Middle Ages, 
ed. Friedman and Pickavé, Forthcoming.
In this paper, I will focus on Durand of St.-Pourçain’s (d. 1334) rejection of 
the higher-order theory and his defense of a same-order theory. Durand’s 
basic argument against the higher-order theory is rather straightforward. 
He defends a general (and popular) thesis about the mind according to 
which a given mental power can have or elicit only one mental act at a given
time: the intellect can elicit only one act of thinking at a time; sight only one
act of seeing; and so on. Call this the one-act-at-a-time thesis.2 While many 
medieval philosophers put forward this thesis,3 Durand provides us with one
of the most sustained defenses of it — and recognized as such by both his 
contemporaries and later commentators alike4 — in the third quaestio of his 
2 As we will see, this thesis entails that a single mental act might sometimes
be about or represent multiple distinct things at the same time, e.g., I might
think with one mental act about both smoke and fire at the same time. Such 
a thesis is opposed to the multiple-acts-at-a-time thesis according to which 
it is at least possible that a given mental power might elicit or have multiple
mental acts at the same time, e.g., I might be thinking about smoke with 
one act while at the same time thinking about fire with a distinct act.
3 See the authors and texts referenced in Russell Friedman, “On the Trail of 
a Philosophical Debate: Durand of St. Pourçain vs. Thomas Wylton on 
Simultaneous Acts in the Intellect,” in Philosophical Debates in the Early 
Fourteenth Century, ed. Brown, Dewender, and Kobusch (Leiden: Brill, 
2009), 433–64; “Mental Propositions before Mental Language,” in Le 
langage mental du Moyen Âge à l’âge classique, ed. Biard (Leuven: Peeters, 
2009), 95–115; Olivier Dubouclez, “Plura simul intelligere. Éléments pour 
une histoire du débat médiéval et renaissant sur la simultanéité des actes 
de l’intellect,” Recherches de théologie et philosophie médiévales 81.2 
(2014): 331–67; Dominik Perler, “Are Reflexive Acts Possible? A Late 
Medieval Controversy,” in Miroir de l'amitié: Mélanges offerts à Joël Biard, 
ed. Grellard (Paris: Vrin, 2017), 213–26; and Robert Pasnau, After 
Certainty: A History of Our Epistemic Ideals and Illusions (Oxford: OUP, 
2017), 96–98, 290–92.
4 See, e.g., Thomas Wylton, Quaestio “Quod in intellectu possunt esse plures
intellectiones simul” [= Quaestio “Quod in intellectu…”] (ed. Prospero 
Stella, “Le Quaestiones de libero arbitrio di Durando da S. Porciano,” 
Salesianum 24 [1962]), 506–17; Guy Terrena, Quodl. (ed. Friedman, “On the
Trail”) 1.14, 458–61; Prosper de Reggio Emilia, Sent. (Vatican, lat. 1086) 
1.1.3.1, ff. 79ra–81va; John Baconthorpe, Sent. (Cremona 1618) 2.10.1; 
Durandellus (aka Durandus de Aureliaco), Evidentia contra Durandum (ed. 
Stella 2003) 1.1; Peter Auriol, Sent. (Rome 1605) 2.11.3, a. 3; Francis of 
Marchia, Sent. (ed. Mariani 1997) 1.1.7; and Gregory of Rimini, Lectura (ed.
Trapp, Marcolina, and Eckermann 1981) 1.1.1, a. 3.  Late scholastics also 
regularly cited Durand’s arguments, e.g., Thomas Cajetan, Gabriel Vasquez,
Philippe Fabri, inter alia; see Dubouclez, “Plura simul intelligere,” 332, fn. 
2, and the references therein.
Quaestiones de libero arbitrio (henceforth: QLA),5 where he also applies the 
thesis to the case of reflex and direct acts. Granted that, in general, a given 
mental power can have or elicit only one mental act at a time, it follows that
state consciousness cannot be a matter of my mind’s possession of a higher-
order (reflex) act at the same time as my lower-order (direct) act of thinking
about the wine in front of me. On Durand’s view, the reflex and the direct 
act are not distinct simultaneous acts but one and the same act.
I will first go over two arguments that Durand puts forward in his general 
defense of the one-act-at-a-time thesis in QLA q. 3.6 I will then look in some 
detail at his application of this thesis to the problem of state consciousness.7
5 For discussion of this text, see Josef Koch, Durandus de S. Porciano 
(Münster: Aschendorff, 1927), chs. 6–7; Stella, “Le Quaestiones,” 450–524; 
Thomas Jeschke, Deus ut tentus vel visus: Die Debatte um die Seligkeit im 
reflexiven Akt (ca. 1293–1320) (Leiden: Brill, 2010), ch. 6; and Stephen 
Dumont, “New Questions by Thomas Wylton,” Documenti e studi sulla 
tradizione filosofica medievale 9 (1998): 367–73. The first two questions are 
revised from Durand’s de aula and in vesperis debates, which themselves 
can be reliably dated to 1312. However, it is not clear when Durand revised 
them and added the third quaestio, although it must have been shortly 
afterwards, for both Thomas Wylton (Quaestio “Quod in intellectu…”) in 
1312 and Guy Terrena (Quodl. 1.14) in 1313 respond to the third question. 
All references to the Quaestiones de aula, in vesperis, and de libero arbitrio 
are from the edition in Stella, “Le Quaestiones.” QLA q. 3 along with 
Wylton’s Quaestio “Quod in intellectu…” are reproduced, often verbatim, in 
Prosper de Reggio Emilia, Sent. 1.1.3.1 and John Baconthorpe, Sent. 2.10.1.
6 While Durand appeals to the one-act-at-time thesis elsewhere (e.g., Sent. 
C, Prologus, q. 1, nn. 24, 28–29; 2.11.2, n. 10; 2.24.1, n. 5; 2.24.2, n. 25; 
Quaestio de aula, 455; Quaestio in vesperis, 453; and QLA q. 1, 474) in each
of these locations he merely states the thesis but does not argue for it. In 
fact, in Sent. C, Prologus, q. 1, n. 24, Durand tells us that he has “already 
proven this elsewhere.” Since there is nowhere else earlier in Sent. C where
he could have done so, he must have had in mind some other work, likely 
QLA q. 3 (see Friedman, “On the Trail,” 439). There are, however, two other
places where Durand does defend the one-act-at-a-time thesis, namely, 
Sent. 1.38.2 and 2.38.3, where he puts forward versions of the cognitive 
means and unity-of-act arguments discussed below.
7 Durand also discusses reflex acts in his defense of his (somewhat) famous 
claim that beatific enjoyment consists in a reflex act (e.g. Sent. B 1.1.1; 
Sent. C 1.1.2); for discussion, see Friedman, “On the Trail,” 443–47 and 
Jeschke, Deus ut tentus vel visus. However, Durand does not discuss the 
question that concerns us here in that context, namely, whether or not the 
reflex act is really distinct from the direct act; instead, he adopts a more 
neutral stance: beatific enjoyment consits in a reflex act regardless of 
In the final section, I consider an objection to Durand’s alternative proposal:
If direct acts and reflex acts are not really distinct, then, it would seem, all 
my mental acts would be conscious.
1. The One-Act-At-A-Time Thesis.
In QLA q. 3 Durand identifies three cases where it might seem that a mental
power can elicit or have multiple mental acts at the same time. Can the 
intellect elicit two thoughts at the same time each of which is precisely 
about the same object, e.g., two simultaneous thoughts about the roundness
of the earth? (Case A: 488.17–489.14) Can the intellect elicit two thoughts 
at the same time about distinct but unrelated objects, e.g., one thought 
about sweetness alone and another (simultaneous) thought about whiteness
alone? (Case C: 491.31–495.7) Finally, can the intellect elicit multiple 
thoughts at the same time about distinct objects as related to each other? 
That is, when the intellect judges that, say, whiteness is different from 
sweetness, does this require multiple thoughts at the same time, or will one 
thought suffice? (Case B: 489.15–491.30)
Since our concern is with reflex acts, we can safely pass over Cases A and 
C. Case A concerns thoughts about precisely one and the same object and 
Case C concerns thoughts about distinct objects as unrelated to each other; 
but during an episode of mental reflection I am thinking about two distinct 
objects as related to each other. For instance, when I think that I am 
thinking about the wine in front of me, I am thinking about the wine and 
also my direct thought about it; but these two objects (wine and my thought 
about the wine) are clearly related to each other: the latter is somehow of 
or about the former. It is Case B, then, that is relevant to the issue of state 
consciousness. Fortunately, the arguments Durand makes establishing the 
one-act-at-a-time thesis in Case B are quite independent from his arguments
in the other two cases.8
whether or not this reflex act is distinct from the direct act (of seeing God). 
All references to Sent. C are from Venice 1571 (reprinted by The Gregg 
Press 1964). All references to Sent. A and Sent. B are from the ongoing 
critical edition from the Thomas Institute at the University of Cologne, 
unless otherwise noted. When the text of the various redactions is the same,
I will signal this using, e.g., Sent. A/B (i.e., Sent. A and Sent. B). If all 
versions are the same, I will simply use Sent.
8 For a discussion of Durand’s arguments for the thesis in Cases A and C, 
see Friedman, “On the Trail,” 434–35. This is also fortunate because these 
arguments (drawn largely from Aquinas) rest upon controversial ontological
assumptions about mental acts; more precisely, they assume that a mental 
act is or at least requires an absolute thing added to the intellect (either the
act itself or an intelligible species), an assumption that Durand tells us “at 
Let’s look, then, at Case B. Durand adduces three arguments for the thesis 
that the intellect can have or elicit only one thought at a time when one is 
thinking about distinct things as related to each other. However, I will only 
look in detail at the first and second arguments as these bear most directly 
on Durand’s analysis of reflex acts. The first is based on the technical notion
of a ‘cognitive means’ (ratio cognoscendi). Durand writes:
When one thing is a cognitive means with respect to another thing 
(unum est ratio cognoscendi alterum), then both fall under the same
[mental] act [at the same time]. For instance, we see color and 
quantity at the same time [with one mental act], for the former is a 
cognitive means with respect to the latter. However, when one thing
is cognized through another thing through a relationship they have 
to each other (unum cognoscitur per aliud per habitudinem quam 
habent ad invicem), then the former is a cognitive means with 
respect to the latter. For instance, a cause is a cognitive means with
respect to its effect a priori, and an effect is a cognitive means with 
respect to its cause a posteriori; and so on likewise with all other 
[relationships] (et consimiliter in omnibus aliis). (QLA q. 3, 489.30–
35)9
present” (QLA q. 3, 488.28–29) he will maintain even though he had 
explicitly rejected such a view a few years earlier, e.g., in Sent. A 2.3.5. On 
the ontology of mental acts in Durand, see Peter John Hartman, “The 
Relation-Theory of Mental Acts: Durand of St.-Pourçain on the Ontological 
Status of Mental Acts,” Oxford Studies in Medieval Philosophy 7 (2019): 
186–211 and the references therein. Wylton, in fact, presses Durand on this 
point, arguing that if mental acts were relations, then many of Durand’s 
arguments for the one-act-at-a-time thesis would fail dramatically (Quaestio 
“Quod in intellectu…” 508.37–509.7; 510.14–16; 514.13–28). Roughly, the 
idea is that whereas a single mental power cannot have multiple absolute 
forms inhering in it at the same time, it could all the same stand in multiple 
relations at the same time, a possibility Durand even admits. See also 
Prosper, Sent. 1.1.3.1, ff. 80va-b, 80rb, who embraces the view that mental 
acts are mere relations that a mental power stands in and so rejects the 
one-act-at-a-time thesis for precisely that reason. This might also explain 
why the only arguments for the one-act-at-a-time thesis we find in Durand’s 
(early) Sent. A (1.38.2 and 2.38.3) are directed at Case B; as we will see 
such arguments do not make any such ontological assumptions (see the 
discussion below).
9 All translations are my own, unless otherwise indicated. The same 
argument is later used by Palude, e.g., Quodl. (Toulouse, Bibliothèque 
municipale 744) q. 11, f. 114rb; q. 6, ff. 101va, 102ra-b, and 104va. Durand 
adduces a similar argument in Sent. 2.38.3, applied to the case of the will 
(drawing from Aquinas, Summa theologiae 1.19.5), where he argues that an
end is a cognitive means by which I grasp the means to that end and so both
Call this the cognitive means argument. A cognitive means, as a first 
approximation, is something we use in order to think about something 
else.10 For instance, a statue of Hercules can be used as a cognitive means 
with respect to Hercules: I think about Hercules thanks to thinking about 
the statue in virtue of the (relationship of) resemblance that it bears with 
Hercules. (Of course, I can also think about the statue on its own without 
using it as a cognitive means; I might also think about Hercules on his own, 
if he is present, without the statue as a cognitive means; and I might even 
use Hercules as a cognitive means to think about the statue instead.) Now, 
in general, Durand tells us, whenever I think about X as related to Y (no 
matter how X is related to Y), I must use one of them as a cognitive means 
with respect to the other, that is, I must use one of them to think about the 
other. However, again according to Durand, whenever X is a cognitive 
means with respect to Y, I must cognize both of them at the same time and 
with the same act. (I must cognize both Hercules and the statue at the same
time and with the same act when I use the statue as a cognitive means to 
think about Hercules.) Hence, whenever I think about two things as related 
to each other, I must do so with one act and not multiple acts at the same 
time. For instance, when I make an a posteriori judgment that smoke is 
caused by fire, I am using smoke as the cognitive means with respect to fire,
and so I must cognize both smoke and fire at the same time and with one 
and the same act. 
One must admit that the cognitive means argument is somewhat 
underdeveloped. Even if we admit that such a judgment requires me to use 
smoke as a cognitive means with respect to fire, and so cognize both smoke 
and fire at the same time as a result, an opponent might still insist that such
a judgment need not consist in a single mental act: multiple simultaneous 
mental acts — one about smoke, the other about fire — might well explain 
are grasped with one act. See also QLA q. 3, 498.8–19. A similar argument 
can be found in Aquinas, e.g., Quodl. 7.1.2 and Summa contra gentiles 1.55;
for discussion (and further texts), see Therese Scarpelli Cory, Aquinas on 
Human Self-Knowledge (Cambridge: CUP, 2014), 138–40.
10 A cognitive means might be an uncognized cognitive means or a cognized 
one; an example of the former would be an intelligible or sensible species 
while an example of the latter would be an picture or image. An uncognized 
cognitive means (e.g., a species) is that through which I cognize something 
but not that which I cognize, that is, it is used to think about something else
even though it is not itself thought about, e.g, I might think about Hercules 
through a species of Hercules without thinking about the species of 
Hercules. Durand here has in mind cognized cognitive means. In fact, he 
rejects uncognized cognitive means elsewhere. On this distinction, and 
Durand’s rejection of species, see Peter John Hartman, “Durand of St.-
Pourçain and Thomas Aquinas on Representation,” History of Philosophy 
Quarterly 30.1 (2013): 19–34.
what needs to be explained. Durand has, in other words, failed to establish 
that the alternative — the multiple-acts-at-a-time thesis — is implausible.
Durand’s second argument — which I will call the unity-of-act argument — 
aims to do just that (ibid., 489.36–490.23).11 Consider a case of judging that 
whiteness is different from sweetness. According to Durand, appealing to 
Aristotle’s De anima (3.2 426b17–23), in such a case there must not only be 
a unity of subject (i.e., one subject) but also a unity of power (i.e., one 
power). Further, according to Durand, the sorts of considerations that 
Aristotle puts forward establishing that such a case requires a unity of 
subject and power also establish that there must be a unity of act (i.e., one 
act).12
Let us step through Durand’s argument here. Now, quite reasonably, 
Aristotle maintains that there must be one subject in order to judge that 
whiteness is different from sweetness. If Bob sees something white and I 
taste something sweet, then neither Bob nor I could judge that whiteness is 
different from sweetness. Hence, a unity of subject is required (ibid., 
489.45–490.1). However, according again to Aristotle, one subject with only 
two distinct powers (sight and taste, say) will also be insufficient, for I 
cannot grasp sweetness by means of sight nor can I grasp whiteness by 
means of taste. Hence, we must posit a third mental power that grasps both
whiteness and sweetness in order to judge that whiteness is different from 
sweetness, or, in other words, a unity of power is required in addition to a 
unity of subject (ibid., 490.1–4).
11 For discussion of this argument, see Friedman, “Mental Propositions,” 
101–103. Palude (drawing from Durand) puts forward the same argument in
Quodl. 6, f. 118va. A similar argument was put forward later by Hugh of 
Lawton (1320s); see Hester Gelber, “I Cannot Tell a Lie: Hugh of Lawton’s 
Critique of William of Ockham on Mental Language,” Franciscan Studies 44 
(1984): 141–79. John of Jandun as well had considered (and rejected) a 
similar argument (Super libros Aristotelis de anima subtilissimae 
quaestiones [Venice 1552] 3.32); for discussion, see Dubouclez, “Plura simul
intelligere,” 339–42.
12 Indeed, Durand thinks that Aristotle was committed to this further claim 
(ibid., 490.10–13): “It seems that the Philosopher was motivated to maintain
a unity of power […] because otherwise he would not have been able to 
maintain that there was a unity of act[…]” On Aristotle, see Victor Caston, 
“Aristotle on Consciousness,” Mind 111.444 (2002): 751–815, who 
interprets Aristotle along the same lines and as thus subscribing to a same-
order theory. On medieval interpretations of Aristotle here, see Jack Zupko, 
“Self-Knowledge and Self-Representation in Later Medieval Psychology,” in 
Mind, Cognition, and Representation, ed. Bakker and Thijssen (Aldershot: 
Ashgate, 2007), 87–107.
So far so good. However, Durand goes on to extend the argument to acts 
themselves. Suppose this one power by which I judge that whiteness is 
different from sweetness is the intellect, for the sake of argument. (It could 
be the common sense too.) Now, suppose that the intellect grasps whiteness
by means of one mental act, M1, and sweetness by means of another mental
act, M2. According to Durand, this will not suffice. He writes: 
When there are [two] apprehensions [i.e. mental acts] that are such 
that not only each on its own but both together are about absolute 
objects, then the [relation of] sameness or difference between these 
[two absolute] objects, since it is a relation, can be grasped neither 
through one of these apprehensions nor through several [i.e., both] 
together.13
In the case at hand, M1 has something absolute as its content (whiteness) 
and M2 likewise has something absolute as its content (sweetness). 
However, the content of my judgment that whiteness is different from 
sweetness includes not just these two absolute things but also something 
non-absolute, namely, the relation of difference between them. Hence, 
mental acts M1 and M2 are insufficient.
Why can we not suppose that, in addition to M1 and M2, there exists at the 
same time a third mental act, M3, through which the intellect grasps the 
relation of difference between whiteness and sweetness? Durand’s answer 
is as follows. Either M3 has as its precise content something relational (i.e., 
the relation of difference), in which case we would be committed to the 
peculiar position that a mental act has as its content just a relation without 
the relata of that relation, or M3 has as its content whiteness, sweetness, 
and the relation of difference between them — but, then, why not apply 
some moderate principle of economy to the whole affair and suppose that 
M3 on its own is sufficient?14
13 Ibid., 490.20–23: “[…] ubi apprehensiones (apprehensionum ed.), non 
solum quaelibet secundum se sed ambae simul, sunt de obiectis secundum 
se et absolute, ibi, nec per unam talium apprehensionum nec per plures 
simul, potest poni convenientia vel differentia obiectorum, quia talis est 
respectus (respectio ed.) […]” See also ibid., 490.13–18. Compare with 
Wylton, Quaestio “Quod in intellectu…”; Prosper, Sent. 1.1.3.1, f. 79ra; 
Baconthorpe, Sent. 2.10.1, f. 530a: “[…] ubi utraque apprehensio est proprii
(principium[!] Wylton) obiecti secundum se et absolute, ibi ambae 
intellectiones erunt de diversis obiectis secundum se et absolute.”
14 Ibid., 491.21–30: “If it is said that, in addition to these two acts, a third 
act is necessary, which is [the act of] composition or division, against: 
Either with this [third] act (a) [both] the [relation of] composition and the 
relata of the [relation of] composition are thought about, or (b) just the 
[relation of] composition without the relata. If (a), then this [third act] is 
superfluous. If (b), then the [relation of] composition is thought about 
Since what goes for the relation of difference goes for any relation,15 the 
upshot is that for Durand such judgments — thoughts about distinct objects 
as related — require a kind of unity: not just of subject, and not just of 
power, but of act. In order to judge that A is related to B, we must grasp A, 
B, and the relation, R, between A and B with a single unified act.
Admittedly, Durand’s unity-of-act argument appeals to a kind of principle of 
parsimony; but as with any invocation of the razor, an opponent might 
respond by insisting that more must be added. Thomas Wylton does just 
that. According to Wylton, responding directly to Durand, in order to judge 
that whiteness is different from sweetness, a mental act about whiteness, 
M1, and a simultaneous mental act about sweetness, M2, are both 
necessary in addition to a (simultaneous) mental act about whiteness, 
sweetness, and the relation of difference between them (i.e., M3), for 
otherwise I would not know if my judgment is true or false.16 He makes a 
similar move when analyzing our knowledge of the conclusion of a 
demonstrative syllogism. When I know a conclusion, I must know that I 
know that conclusion, and this entails, at least for Wylton, that I must 
without [also thinking] this: that something is composed (ergo intelligitur 
compositio sine hoc quod aliquid componatur), which is impossible and 
contrary to the Philosopher[…]” See also ibid., 489.23–30, quoted in the 
next footnote. For a discussion of this passage in particular, see Friedman, 
“Mental Propositions,” 99–100 and Pasnau, After Certainty, 291.
15 Ibid., 489.39–41: “No power can hold that things are different from each 
other, or the same as each other, or apprehend any relationship (habitudo) 
whatsoever between some things, since the same account applies to them 
all, unless it apprehends each [thing] together [with the same act].” See 
also ibid., 489.23–30: “An ordering (ordo) or any relationship (habitudo) 
whatsoever between multiple things cannot be cognized without the relata 
of that ordering or relationship, for just as it is impossible to think about the
[relation of] composition or division between some things without thinking 
about the composed or divided relata, so too it is impossible to think about 
the ordering or relationship between multiple things without also thinking 
at the same time about the relata of that relationship or ordering, no matter
what sort of relationship this might be, e.g., one of sameness 
(convenientiae), difference (differentiae), opposition (oppositionis), 
separation (disparationis), etc. Hence, someone who cognizes something as 
ordered to or in a relationship with something else necessarily cognizes 
each of them at the same time through the same act.”
16 Quaestio “Quod in intellectu…” 508.18–20: “Someone who is dividing or 
composing some things with respect to each other cognizes them under 
their proper concepts just as they compose [or divide] them[…], for 
otherwise they would not know if they truly or falsely composed them 
(nesciret si vere componeret vel false).”
simultaneously grasp that the premises in themselves are true and 
necessary. Hence, one act that is about both the premises and the 
conclusion (together with the relation of entailment) is insufficient for 
knowing that conclusion: I must elicit multiple simultaneous acts.17
While we do not have Durand’s reply (if any) to Wylton’s objection, Durand 
does have the resources to face it, I submit, if we look at another discussion 
of the unity-of-act argument, namely, Sent. 1.38.2. In that text, Durand 
maintains again that the judgment that whiteness is different from 
sweetness is just one act (i.e., M3). However, he adds an important 
clarification. M3 is one act that virtually (but not really) contains two other 
acts: M1 (about whiteness) and M2 (about sweetness).18 (Wylton, by 
contrast, maintains that M3 is a kind of ‘composite’ act that really contains 
acts M1 and M2.)19 Durand draws an analogy with softness, dryness, and 
17 Quaestio “Quod in intellectu…” 507.40–44: “If someone actually knows a 
conclusion, then […] they will know that they know it, and so it is necessary 
that at that moment wherein they actually know the conclusion they not just
cognize the premises as related to the conclusion [i.e. act M3], but also that 
the premises in themselves are true [i.e. acts M1 and M2], for otherwise, at 
that moment, they would not know that they know the conclusion.” See also 
ibid., 506.4–7. For a discussion of both of these arguments, see Friedman, 
“Mental Propositions,” 97–99.
18 Sent. 1.38.2, n. 5: “[…] the intellect, thinking by composing and dividing, 
thinks about those things which it composes or divides with one essentially 
simple act (uno actu simplici per essentiam), which, however, virtually 
contains (virtute continet) the two antecedent acts with which we thought 
about human being on its own (seorsum) or animal or donkey on its own 
(seorsum) [… This] act virtually contains (continet virtualiter) the two 
antecedent acts […] even though it is simple in its essence (simplex in sua 
essentia) […] The intellect […] thinks about distinct intelligible things with 
distinct acts […] which are necessarily presupposed to a third act which 
virtually contains (virtualiter continet) them; and this third act would not 
exist if these [antecedent acts] had not existed beforehand.” Sent. A 2.38.3 
ad 4, n. 17 (also present in four manuscripts that witness to Sent. B): “The 
composite act […] virtually contains the two antecedent simple acts, that is, 
what was understood about the predicate and what was understood about 
the subject (virtute continet duos actus simplices praecedentes, scilicet 
intellectum praedicati et intellectum subiecti).” For discussion, see 
Friedman, “On the Trail,” 453, fn. 52 and “Mental Propositions”, 101.
19 Quaestio “Quod in intellectu…” 508.12–14: “[…] there cannot be such a 
composite act except insofar as it is composed out of multiple acts of 
thinking.” Ibid., 511.17–26: “[…] it contains (comprehendit) two simple acts 
of thinking[…] This comparative act (comparativus actus) contains 
(comprehendit) in itself the two simple acts through which the intellect 
wetness to elucidate this notion of virtual containment. Softness is just as 
much a simple quality as dryness and wetness are; however, softness 
virtually contains both dryness and wetness insofar as it exhibits certain 
features of each: like a dry thing (but unlike a wet thing) a soft thing holds 
its own shape, but like a wet thing (and unlike a dry thing) it is easily 
molded.20 Applied to the case at hand, we might suppose that a mental act, 
C, that virtually contains acts A and B includes in its content (at least) the 
content that A and B would have had on their own. Hence, M3 (the 
judgment that whiteness is different from sweetness) includes in its content 
whiteness and sweetness; M3 is about or represents what M1 and M2 would
have been about or represented on their own. Thus, as a reply to Wylton’s 
objections, Durand could simply insist that since M3 includes in its content 
at least what M1 and M2 on their own would have included in their content,
we do not need to maintain that such judgments require M1 and M2 as 
simultaneously existing acts with M3. M3 should be sufficient for providing 
me with the requisite content to know, e.g., that the premises are true in 
themselves or that the composition is a true composition.21
cognizes each of the relata which it compares to each other under their 
proper concepts.” Francis of Marchia, who also responds to Durand here, 
holds a similar view.  See, e.g., Sent 1.1.7, 531–32, where he tells us that 
the two simple acts are ‘materially’ or ‘dispositively’ (materialiter et 
dispositive) contained in the third composite act.  For discussion, see 
Friedman, “Mental Propositions,” 106–112.
20 Ibid., n. 5: “We say that wetness and dryness are simple qualities, 
whereas softness is a composite quality; however, softness is as simple in its
essence as the others (in essentia sua est aeque simplex ut aliae).  It is 
called ‘composite’ because it somehow virtually contains (aliquo modo 
continet virtualiter) wetness and dryness, for insofar as something soft is 
easily molded (facile cedit), it retains (retinet) the nature of wetness; and 
insofar as it holds its own shape (est terminatum termino proprio) it retains 
the nature of dryness. Likewise, in the case at hand, the third act virtually 
contains (continet virtualiter) the two antecedent acts, and so it is called 
‘composite’ even though it is simple in its essence (simplex in essentia 
sua).”
21 Durand’s theory of virtual containment found its proponents, e.g., Palude, 
Quodl. q. 6, f. 102va and Sent. 1.38.2 (Barcelona, Archivo Capitular de la 
Santa Iglesia Catedral 35), f. 173va; Baconthorpe, Sent. 1.1.2, ff. 64b–65a; 
2.6.1, ff. 512a–15b; and 2.10.1, ff. 534a–35a; and, more famously, Rimini, 
Lectura, Prologus, q. 1, whose version of the view came to exhibit some 
considerable influence on the 16th-century debate about the structure of 
propositions; see E. Jennifer Ashworth, “Mental Language and the Unity of 
Propositions,” Franciscan Studies 41.1 (1981): 73–96, 
doi:10.1353/frc.1981.0004. On the connection between Durand and Rimini 
(who, incidentally, rejects the one-act-at-a-time thesis — and precisely 
With this in mind, then, let us now turn to Durand’s contention that reflex 
acts and direct acts are not really distinct.
2. Reflex Acts.
In the fifth opening argument to QLA q. 3, Durand considers the following 
argument against the one-act-at-a-time thesis. Suppose I am thinking about 
a rose (a direct act) and at the same time thinking that I am thinking about 
that rose (a reflex act). Call this a case of mental reflection properly so-
called. As the argument puts it, in such a case
the direct act and the reflex act are two acts; but these exist at the 
same time[…]; therefore, two acts can exist in the same power at 
the same time. (486.25–27)
Note that both Durand and his opponent here accept the minor premise in 
the above argument, namely, that in a case of mental reflection properly so-
called the direct act and the reflex act exist at the same time. Call this the 
simultaneity thesis. This might seem trivially true — after all, if the direct 
act did not exist at the same time as the reflex act, then I would not be 
thinking that I am now thinking about a rose, but instead that I was thinking
about a rose. However, some philosophers rejected the simultaneity thesis. 
John Baconthorpe, for instance, motivated in part by his commitment to the 
one-act-at-a-time thesis, insists that mental reflection properly so-called 
does not involve two simultaneously existing mental acts. According to 
Baconthorpe, just as when I think about a rose all that is needed is a 
representation of the rose and not an actually existing rose, so too in the 
case at hand: when I (reflexivly) think about a direct act of thinking, all that 
is needed is a representation of a direct act of thinking and not an actually 
existing direct act of thinking. Hence, in such a case, there is just one 
actually existing act (the reflex act) which is about another act (the direct 
act) that does not actually exist at that time.22 Since both Durand and his 
Durand’s arguments for it — even though he still adopts a unity theory of 
propositions much like Durand), see Friedman, “Mental Propositions,” 113–
115.
22 As Baconthorpe puts it, it is objectively (obiective) present but not really 
present (realiter). See Baconthorpe, Sent. (ed. Jeschke, Deus ut tentus vel 
visus) 1.1.1, 595–613 and Radulphus Brito, Quaestio “Utrum actus rectus et 
reflexus sint unus actus” (Vatican, lat. 1086), ff. 205va–206rb, who might be
the source for Baconthorpe’s view, and whose view is attacked by John of 
Pouilly, Palude, and Durand. (Or at any rate, since we cannot date Brito’s 
text very exactly, the view Brito endorses is verbatim at times the view we 
find under attack.) See Pouilly, Quodl. (ed. Jeschke) 5.7, nn. 37–41, 698–99; 
Palude, Quodl. q. 6, f. 103va-vb; and Durand, QLA q. 3, 497.21–24. Prosper 
(Sent. 1.1.3.1) quotes from Brito’s quaestio on f. 80ra-b in Vatican, lat. 1086
opponent accept the simultaneity thesis, I will leave this option to one 
side.23
Now, clearly if one endorses the view that the intellect can elicit or have 
only one act at a time, as Durand does, and one also endorses the 
simultaneity thesis, as Durand does, then one must reject the major premise
in the above argument — that the direct act and the reflex act are distinct 
acts — and with it the higher-order theory of state consciousness, as 
Durand does.24 If, however, one maintains the simultaneity thesis but rejects
and attributes the quotation to M. Radulphus Brito in the margin. On some 
interpretations of Aquinas, this is his view too; see, e.g., Robert Pasnau, 
Thomas Aquinas on Human Nature (Cambridge: CUP, 2002), 345–347; for 
alternative interpretations of Aquinas, see the footnote after the next.
23 Durand’s argument for it is quick (497.24–27): “It is impossible that 
whiteness exist in a subject and yet that subject not be formally a white 
thing in virtue of whiteness; so too it is impossible that some act of 
cognizing exist in the intellect and yet the intellect not be formally a 
cognizing thing in virtue of it; thus, it exists as a cognition and not just as a 
cognized item.” For a similar argument, see Palude, Quodl. q. 6, f. 103ra, 
103va-b and Pouilly, Quodl. 5.7, n. 40, 699. Another common argument runs
that the proposition, “I am now thinking about a rose,” would be false were 
simultaneity not true. See here Pouilly, ibid., nn. 36–40, 698–99; Guy 
Terrena, Quodl. 1.14, n. 9, 460; and Palude, ibid., f. 103va, among many 
others (but not Durand).
24 Examples of same-order theorists who are motivated by both the one-act-
at-a-time thesis and the simultaneity thesis include John Pouilly, Quodl. 5.7 
(for discussion, see Jeschke, Deus ut tentus vel visus, 227–48) and Palude, 
Quodl. qq. 6, 9, 11; Sent. (ed. Jeschke) 1.1.1, a. 3, 743–47; and Sent. (ed. 
Jeschke) 4.49.4, a. 3, 780–89. In Quodl. q. 6, f. 102vb, Palude, not 
unexpectedly, interprets Aquinas as holding a same-order theory. While 
Aquinas definitely defends the one-act-at-a-time thesis (see footnote 3 
above), he seems to offer us two different views about reflex acts. On the 
one hand, he seems to maintain a kind of same-order theory, e.g., Sent. 
1.1.2, a. 1 ad 2: “[…] eadem operatione intelligo intelligibile et intelligo me 
intelligere.” On the other hand, he seems to maintain, perplexingly, 
something like a higher-order theory, e.g., Summa theologiae 1.87.3 ad 2: 
“[…] alius est actus quo intellectus intelligit lapidem, et alius est actus quo 
intelligit se intelligere lapidem[…]” According to Palude, in the latter text 
Aquinas is not talking about mental reflection properly so-called, but about 
remembering. On Aquinas on this issue, see Cory, Aquinas on Human Self-
Knowledge, 134–73, and the texts cited therein, who interprets Aquinas as 
holding the same-order theory. For the differing interpretations of Aquinas, 
see especially ibid., 136, fns. 4–7. See also, more recently, Rode, Zugänge 
zum Selbst, 37–60 and Brower-Toland, “Self-Knowledge,” Forthcoming.
the one-act-at-a-time thesis, then one could either defend the higher-order 
theory, as the opponent here does,25 or one could reject the higher-order 
theory, but for reasons orthogonal to the debate about whether or not a 
given mental power can elicit multiple mental acts at the same time. (This 
appears to be the case with Walter Chatton, who rejects both the one-act-at-
a-time thesis as well as the higher-order theory of state consciousness. 
According to Chatton, what makes an act conscious is not a reflex act about 
it but the fact that it was received in a suitable power.)26
In his reply, then, to the fifth objection, Durand first divides the 
phenomenon of mental reflection into two basic sorts: remembering a past 
act of thinking about the rose, on the one hand, and thinking about a 
present act of thinking about the rose — mental reflection properly so-called
— on the other. As we will see, Durand is not merely being pedantic here. 
25 Examples of higher-order theorists who reject the one-act-at-a-time thesis 
and embrace the simultaneity thesis include Guy Terrena, Quodl. 1.14; 
Prosper, Sent. 1.1.3.1; Ockham, Reportatio (ed. Gál and Wood 1981) 2.17; 
Quodl. (ed. Wey 1980) 1.12 and 1.14; Wodeham, Lectura secunda (ed. Wood
and Gál 1990), Prologus, q. 2, 1:53–64; and William Crathorn, Sent. (ed. 
Hoffman 1988) 1.2, 180. On Guy, see Friedman, “On the Trail,” 451. Note 
that Guy’s rejection of the one-act-at-a-time thesis is limited to just reflex 
and direct acts: in general the intellect can have or elicit only one act at a 
time, but owing to the special ‘connection’ between a reflex and direct act, 
mental reflection proves the exception to the rule (ibid., nn. 9–11, 460–61). 
On Ockham, see Rode, Zugänge zum Selbst, 223–48; Lydia Deni Gamboa, 
“Can We Reflexively Access the Contents of Our Own Perceptions?,” British 
Journal for the History of Philosophy 27.5 (2019): 921–40, 
doi:10.1080/09608788.2018.1537255; Susan Brower-Toland, “Medieval 
Approaches to Consciousness: Ockham and Chatton,” Philosophers’ Imprint 
12.17 (2012): 1–29; “William Ockham on the Scope and Limits of 
Consciousness,” Vivarium 52.3 (2014): 197–219, doi:10.1163/15685349-
12341275; and Sonja Schierbaum, “Ockham on the Possibility of Self-
Knowledge,” Vivarium 52.3 (2014): 220–40, doi:10.1163/15685349-
12341276. On Wodeham, see Rode, 261–79.
26 Chatton, Sent. (ed. Wey 1989), Prologus, q. 2, a. 5. Chatton distinguishes 
such a (pre-reflexive) experience of the received act from a reflex act, which
he argues is a distinct simultaneous act (ibid., 126–27). For discussion, see 
Rode, Zugänge zum Selbst, 249–60; Charles Girard, “Some Medievals and 
Brentano on Reflexivity and the Structure of Mental Acts,” Topoi, 
Forthcoming; Brower-Toland, “William Ockham on the Scope and Limits of 
Consciousness”; and “Medieval Approaches to Consciousness.” I’ll discuss 
some of the differences between Chatton and Durand below. Another 
thinker who also rejects the one-act-at-a-time thesis but still considers a 
same-order theory like Durand’s viable is Francis of Meyronnes (Sent. 
[Venice 1520] 1.3.11, f. 28rb-vb); see below footnote 34.
His analysis of remembering will help to illuminate mental reflection 
properly so-called, for both have the same basic structure, namely, both are 
cases of thinking about two distinct objects as related (i.e., Case B).
According to Durand, when I remember that yesterday I was thinking about 
a rose, I am thinking about a rose (thanks to a representation of the rose) 
and also the past act with it (i.e., the act that I elicited yesterday about the 
rose), and I do so with just one act. Durand writes:
From the presence of the rose, however it might be represented to 
me, I jump (consurgo) not just to a cognition of the rose but also to a
cognition of the [past] cognition had before about the rose. Hence, 
the one [i.e., the rose] is a cognitive means with respect to the other
[i.e., the cognition had before about the rose] (unum est ratio 
cognoscendi alterum), and so they both fall under one act, as was 
proved earlier. (Ibid., 497.3–6)
Recall the cognitive means argument discussed above. When I judge that 
smoke is caused by fire, smoke is used as a cognitive means with respect to 
fire: I cognize fire thanks to my cognition of smoke and the causal 
relationship in which it stands to fire. As a result, I cognize both smoke and 
fire at the same time and with the same act. Indeed, as the unity-of-act 
argument establishes, I must cognize both with one and the same act. So 
too in the case at hand. When I remember that yesterday I was thinking 
about a rose — or better: when I judge that the rose was thought about by 
the past act — the rose functions as a cognitive means with respect to the 
past act: I cognize the past act thanks to my cognition of the rose and the 
relationship (of having-been-thought-about) in which it stands to the past 
act. Hence, I can (and must) grasp both (rose and past act) with a single act
at the same time.
Durand goes on to apply the same sort of analysis to mental reflection 
properly so-called. When I think that I am now thinking about the rose, I 
judge that the rose is now being thought about by a present act. The rose, 
once more, functions as a cognitive means, but this time with respect to a 
present act rather than a past act.
When I think that I am thinking about the rose, there is only one 
primary object (unicum principale obiectum),27 namely, the rose, 
and it is through a relation from this object that I cognize whatever 
27 Reading ‘principale’ for ‘potentialem’. The contrast is with a secondary 
object (obiectum secundarium); see Sent. 1.35.1, nn. 14–16 and 1.36.3, nn. 
10, 13, 26. According to Durand, when I cognize A and B such that A is the 
cognitive means with respect to B, then A is the primary object and B the 
secondary object. Palude holds much the same view (Quodl. q. 6, ff. 101rb, 
102ra, 102va, and 104rb). The distinction can be found in Aquinas too (see 
the texts cited above in footnote 10).
else is cognized during an episode of mental reflection (intelligibili 
reflexione). (Ibid., 497.28–30)
The rose stands in certain relations to various things in the world: it stands 
in a relation to whatever it resembles, to whatever caused it, to whatever it 
effects, and, as we saw, it might even stand in a relation to a past act of 
thinking about it. Here, Durand’s point is that it also stands in a relation to 
a present act of thinking about it. During a case of mental reflection 
properly so-called, the rose (the primary object) is a cognitive means with 
respect to the present act of thinking about it (the secondary object). But 
since I must grasp the cognitive means and that with respect to which it is a
cognitive means with one act at the same time, it follows that when I think 
that I am now thinking about the rose (or better: when I judge that the rose 
is now being thought about by my act of thinking) I elicit just one act that 
has as its content both the rose and that very act itself.
As before, multiple mental acts are either insufficient or redundant. 
Suppose for the sake of argument the opponent’s view: I elicit a direct act 
about the rose and a distinct reflex act about that direct act, at the same 
time. These two acts alone would be insufficient for the judgment that I am 
thinking about the rose. Just as there must be one act that grasps (1) 
sweetness and (2) whiteness together with (3) their relation of difference in 
order for there to be a judgment that sweetness is different from whiteness, 
so too there must be one act that grasps (1) the rose and (2) the (direct) act,
together with (3) the relation of being-thought-about in order to judge that I
am now thinking about the rose (or alternatively: that the rose is now being 
thought about by my act of thinking). Nor can we insist that in addition to 
this one act there must be two other acts simultaneously present, one of 
which is about the rose, M1, and the other about the direct act, M2. As 
before, these two acts would be redundant, since the act with which I grasp 
all three — rose, direct act, and the relation of being-thought-about — 
virtually contains both M1 and M2, that is, it includes in its content at least 
the content that these two mental acts (M1 and M2) would have had on 
their own. Multiple mental acts just will not do. The reflex act and the direct
act are not really distinct; they are one and the same act.
Before I turn to an objection to Durand’s account, I want to offer two brief 
remarks about Durand’s same-order theory of state consciousness. First, 
like his higher-order opponent, Durand holds that the reflex act is about the 
direct act: the direct act is represented by (included in the content of) the 
reflex act. Hence, Durand holds that state consciousness is representational
(or intentional) in character. Other same-order theories, e.g., Walter 
Chatton’s, and on some interpretations, Aquinas’s, maintain, by contrast, 
that our experience of our own acts is non-representational in character. 
Chatton, for instance, maintains that what makes an act conscious is the 
fact that it was received in a suitable power; but there is only an attenuated 
sense, at best, in which such reception is about the direct act. Indeed, 
Chatton strongly insists that we not treat such a (pre-reflexive) experience 
of our received acts as an experience of an object.28 In this way, Durand’s 
view would align more readily with, say, Brentano’s same-order theory and 
certain contemporary same-order theories, e.g., Uriah Kriegel’s same order 
monitoring theory, which maintain that state consciousness is 
representational (or intentional) in character.29
Second, Durand holds that the direct act is a part of the reflex act. When I 
judge that whiteness is different from sweetness, there is a single mental 
act, M3, that virtually contains acts M1 (about whiteness) and M2 (about 
sweetness); so too when I judge that I am thinking about the rose: there is a
single mental act, M3, that virtually contains acts M1 (about the rose) and 
M2 (about the direct act about the rose). As suggested above, we should 
understand the notion of virtual containment here in terms of content. If act
C virtually contains acts A and B, what this means is that the content of C 
includes (at least) whatever content A and B would have included on their 
own — it does not mean pace Wylton that C really contains acts A and B. So 
too here. The single (reflex) act, M3, with which I judge that I am thinking 
about the rose, virtually contains acts M1 and M2, that is, it includes in its 
content at least what M1 and M2 would have included in their content on 
their own, namely, the rose and the (direct) act. Hence, although on 
Durand’s view the reflex act and the direct act are one and the same act, 
there is a sense in which we can say that the direct act is a ‘part’ of the 
reflex act. It is, I submit, a logical part of the content of the reflex act just as
much as the rose is a logical part of the content of the reflex act.30
28 Chatton, Sent., Prologus, q. 2, a. 5, e.g., 126: “Alio modo sumitur 
intelligere et videre intellectionem lapidis […] scilicet pro receptione illius 
intellectionis lapidis in mente, quia mentem recipere intellectionem lapidis 
est experiri illam intellectionem, non sicut potentia experitur obiectum, sed 
sicut potentia experitur actum suum recipiendo.” On Chatton, see the 
references in footnote 27 above. For this interpretation of Aquinas, see 
Brower-Toland, “Self-Knowledge.”
29 Indeed, the connection with Brentano is striking. See, e.g., Psychology 
from an Empirical Standpoint, trans. Rancurello, Terrell, and McAlister 
(London: Routledge, YEARREF), II.3, n. 7, 119: “[Every conscious mental 
act] has a double object, a primary and a secondary object. The simplest 
act, for example, the act of hearing, has as its primary object the sound, and
for its secondary object, itself, the mental phenomenon in which the sound 
is heard.” See also ibid., II.2, n. 7, 93–97. For discussion of the connection 
between Brentano and Durand, see Perler, “Are Reflexive Acts Possible?" 
and Girard, “Some Medievals and Brentano on Reflexivity.” On Kriegel, see 
the next footnote.
30 On same-order theories cashed out in terms of a logical part-whole 
relation, see Kriegel, “The Same-Order Monitoring Theory of 
3. Peter & Guy’s Ubiquity Objection
In close, I want to consider an objection that at least two of Durand’s 
contemporaries raised against his account. If reflex acts are not distinct 
from direct acts, then, it would seem, I would be aware of all my mental 
acts, that is, then all my mental acts would be conscious. Call this the 
ubiquity objection. As Peter of Palude puts it (Quodl. q. 6, 130ra-b):
Some people also draw the conclusion that a direct and reflex act 
not only can coexist but also that they always and necessarily do 
coexist. (Quidam etiam concludunt quod actus rectus et reflexus non
solum possunt esse simul sed etiam quod semper et necessario sunt 
simul.)
Palude, at least, argues that this is an untenable claim, for it would seem to 
entail that we are always aware of all our mental acts, which, as Palude 
quips, is not (f. 103rb) “in line with what we all experience alike” (ad illud 
quod conformiter experimur).31 Or, as Guy Terrena puts it, coming at the 
objection from a different angle:
If two things are really the same, then it is impossible that one exist 
while the other does not; but a direct act can exist while a reflex act 
does not. For instance, I can think that I am alive without thinking 
that I am thinking that I am alive. (Quodl. 1.14, n. 7, 459)32
Consciousness,” 145–46: “Another version of SOMT [i.e., the same-order 
monitoring theory] appeals to the part-whole relation[…] The relevant 
notion of parthood here is not spatial or temporal, but logical[…] When I am
glad that the weather is nice, I necessarily also believe that the weather is 
nice; it is impossible to be glad that the weather is nice without believing 
that this is so. But my belief that the weather is nice is not an extra mental 
act, which occurs in addition to my gladness. Rather, the belief is somehow 
inherent in, or built into, the gladness. In other words, my belief is part of 
my gladness, in a logical sense of ‘part of’.” Kriegel goes on to define no less
than six different versions of SOMT that appeal to a logical part-whole 
relation. Noteworthy is the fifth (148): “A mental state M of a subject S is 
conscious iff S has a mental state M*, such that (i) M* is a representation of 
M, and (ii) M is a (proper part) of M*.” This, I submit, is precisely Durand’s 
view.
31 Perhaps conformiter should read communiter instead.
32 Baconthorpe adduces this argument as well in Sent. 1.1.1, a. 2, n. 34, 
604, where he uses it as further support for his refutation of the 
simultaneity thesis (see above footnote 23). Pouilly, Quodl. 5.7, nn. 47–56, 
701–703, recognizes the objection. Ockham adopts it as his own in 
Reportatio 2.17, 5:386, and Wodeham uses it in his criticism of Chatton 
(Lectura secunda, Prologus, q. 2, 1:58–59). For discussion, see Brower-
Sometimes I am just thinking about the wine in front of me and not thinking
about my thinking about the wine in front of me; but if direct acts are really 
the same as reflex acts, then such a case would be impossible.
Before I turn to how Durand might answer such objections, it will be useful 
to draw a distinction between two forms of consciousness: introspective 
consciousness and phenomenal consciousness. A mental act or state is 
phenomenally conscious when there is something it is like to have that 
mental act or be in that mental state. A mental act or state is introspectively
conscious when one takes a step back, as it were, and reflects upon it, i.e., 
when it somehow features as an object of a (reflex) act. For instance, when I
taste the wine in front of me, such an act might be (and usually is) 
phenomenally conscious; but in order for it to be introspectively conscious I 
must take a reflexive step back, as it were, and think about it.33 Peter and 
Guy seem to be insisting, reasonably enough, that not all mental acts are 
introspectively conscious, a desideratum on a theory of state consciousness 
that Durand’s theory, committed as it is to the identity of reflex and direct 
acts, seems incapable of satisfying.
Durand, I submit, denies ubiquity in the case of introspective consciousness.
This is clear if we look at an especially thorny argument — call it the 
argument from memory — found in QLA q. 3 ad 5. I’ll quote it in full and 
then unpack it.
When I cognize that I am cognizing a rose, there are not two acts, 
but rather there is only one act. (A) For no (at least no perfect) 
intellective act lies hidden from the intellect, because a cognition 
that exists in a cognizer cannot lie hidden from the cognizer. 
However, we do not always fully discern this [sc. that we are 
cognizing]. This is clear because (1) an act of remembering can only
be about something cognized beforehand; (2) but there can be an 
act of remembering about every act through which we (at least 
perfectly) cognize something. However, at that very moment we 
might not discern that we are cognizing. (A*) Therefore, every such 
act was not just a cognition but also cognized. (B) Nor was it 
cognized through an act other than itself. (497.6–13)34
Toland, “Medieval Approaches to Consciousness,” 23–25. On the 
contemporary form of the ubiquity objection, see, e.g., David Armstrong and
Norman Malcolm, Consciousness and Causality (Blackwell: Oxford, 1984), 
121–22.
33 Sometimes the distinction is captured in the contrast between monitoring 
consciousness and phenomenal consciousness. See Ned Block,“On a 
Confusion about a Function of Consciousness,” Behaviorial and Brain 
Sciences 18 (1995): 227–287. 
Now, (1) and (2) merely establish the claim (A/A*) that every perfect act (at 
least) must itself be cognized. It does not establish (B) — that every perfect 
act (at least) must be cognized through itself and not through some other 
(higher-order) act. Presumably, Durand must hold that (B) is established 
from arguments he has already made, e.g., the cognitive means and the 
unity-of-act arguments; otherwise I can make little sense of how (B) follows 
from (A/A*).35
Regardless of the success of the argument itself, what Durand says in 
the text set in italics clearly shows that he denies ubiquity in the case of
34 Ibid.: “Quando autem cognosco me cognoscere rosam, nec tunc sunt duo 
actus sed unus. (A) Nullus enim actus intelligendi, saltem perfectus, latet 
intellectum, quia cognitio inexistens in cognoscente non potest ipsum 
latere, quamvis hoc non discernamus semper ad plenum. Et hoc patet, quia 
(1) recordatio non potest esse nisi alicuius praecogniti; (2) sed omni actu 
quo aliquid cognoscimus, saltem perfecte, etiamsi pro tunc non 
discernamus nos cognoscere, potest esse recordatio; (A*) ergo omnis talis 
actus fuit non solum cognitio sed etiam cognitus; (B) nec cognitus alio actu 
quam seipso.” See also Palude’s presentation of the argument (Quodl. q. 6, 
f. 103ra-b): “Dicunt enim quod nihil potest esse in memoria quod prius non 
fuit in intelligentia; sed quicumque semel intellexit aliquid potest recordari 
se illud intellexisse; ergo prius intellexit se illud intelligere; sed non potest 
intelligere se intelligere nisi dum intelligit[…]; ergo quicumque intelligit 
aliquid <intelligit etiam> se intelligere illud; et sic non potest esse actus 
rectus sine reflecto (reflectio MS); sed sicut non semper percipitur actus 
rectus secundum se, sic nec actus reflexus, secundum eos.” See also ibid., f.
103ra. Francis of Meyronnes (1320s) makes the same argument, presenting
it as one of his own in defense of the same-order theory, although he winds 
up not deciding between the same-order and the higher-order theory (Sent. 
1.3.11, f. 28va): “Alias rationes adduco fortiores, supponendo quod nos 
possumus recordari de omni actu nostro quem ante habuimus. Hoc 
supposito suppono etiam aliud tamquam verum: Quod de nullo possumus 
recordari quod ante non intelleximus. Istis praesuppositis formatur sic ratio:
Nullius possumus recordari quod non praefuit in intellectu; sed nos 
possumus recordari de omni actu quem ante habuimus; ergo omnis <actus>
quem ante habuimus praefuit intellectus. Tunc arguo sic: Aut ergo omnes 
<actus> seipsis fuerunt intellecti aut aliis et aliis actibus. Si seipsis, tunc 
idem actus erit intelligens et intellectus, et per consequens idem erit rectus 
et reflexus. Si aliis et aliis, tunc vel dabis mihi ultimum, et tunc ille non erit 
intellectus, vel non dabis mihi ultimum, et tunc multiplicatur in infinitum, 
quod apparet satis inconveniens.” A similar argument is discussed by 
Chatton in Sent., Prologus, q. 2, a. 5, 122 and 124–25.
35 Meyronnes, in his version of the argument, establishes that (B) follows 
from (A/A*) on the grounds that otherwise an infinite regress would obtain 
(see the previous footnote). It is plausible that Durand had something 
introspective consciousness. Durand’s claim in (A/A*) is that some (if 
not all) mental acts are cognized whenever we elicit them, since some 
(if not all) mental acts can be remembered. (For the sake of exposition, I
will assume the stronger claim: all mental acts are cognized whenever 
we elicit them since all mental acts can be remembered.)36 However, 
Durand does not think that all mental acts are, thus, introspectively 
conscious, that is, that I am (introspectively) aware of (or discern) all 
my mental acts whenever I elicit them. Durand’s claim in the italicized 
text is that even if a mental act is cognized, it does not follow that it is 
discerned, that is, it does not follow that I am (introspectively) aware of 
it. Consider: I might be so focused on the wine in front of me that I am 
oblivious of my thought about it, and yet, if you were to ask me what I 
was just doing then, I would answer that I was thinking about the wine. 
I was, one might say, implicitly (or I might even suggest phenomenally) 
aware of my mental act but not explicitly or introspectively aware of it; 
or, as Durand would put it, I cognized my mental act (since I could 
remember it) but I did not discern it.37 Hence, even though all mental 
similar in mind, for both Baconthorpe (Sent. 1.1.1, n. 31, 603–604) and 
Palude (Quodl. q. 6, 103rb), reporting Durand’s position, append an infinite 
regress argument to it. As Palude puts it: “Et confirmatur, quia activis et 
passivis debito modo approximatis necesse est fieri actionem et in instanti 
quando utraque potentia activa et passiva est in ultima dispositione.  Unde 
quando intellectus intelligit, cum sit dispositus ultimate ad intelligendum se 
intelligere et <cum> activum — sive sit primum obiectum solum sive cum 
hoc sit ipse actus rectus et intellectus agens — sit (sint MS) etiam in 
ultimata dispositione nullam ulterius expectans (expectantes MS), statim fit 
ipse actus reflexus vel numquam. Et videtur mihi ratio efficax ad 
probandum indifferentiam realem actus recti et reflexi, quia impossibile est 
esse infinita actu simul distincta genere, specie, vel numero; sequeretur 
autem hoc posita differentia reali inter actum et reflexum; ergo etc.”
36 Meyronnes and Palude both make the stronger claim (see the previous 
two footnotes); this also seems to be the interpretation of the argument that
Friedman puts forward in “On the Trail,” 446–47. Durand does not tell us 
what he means by ‘perfect act’ here. Perler (“Are Reflex Acts Possible?” 
221–23) interprets Durand to have in mind only those acts that are “so vivid
that [they] cannot be ignored.” Sven Knebel (“Durand, Quirós, 
Consciousness,” in Durand of Saint-Pourçain and His Sentences 
Commentary, 359–60) maintains that ‘perfect’ acts are acts of 
“comprehensive knowledge”. I would submit that a perfect act is simply an 
act which reaches the threshold for phenomenal consciousness.
37 On explicit/implicit awareness, see especially Cory, Aquinas on Self-
Knowledge, 134–37. It is not clear to me if Durand would characterize a 
mental act that is cognized but not discerned as phenomenally conscious in 
our sense of the term, that is, that there is something it is like to have that 
acts are cognized whenever we elicit them, not all mental acts are, thus,
introspectively conscious.
But it is one thing for Durand to think that introspective consciousness is 
not ubiquitous and it is quite another to show how on his view it is not in 
fact ubiquitous. If the direct act and the reflex act are identical (one and the
same act), then how can Durand allow for a direct act to exist on its own 
without a reflex (discerning) act? Durand’s solution rests on his theory of 
virtual containment. As we saw above, according to Durand, during an 
episode of mental reflection properly so-called, i.e., when I think (discern) 
that I am thinking about the rose, there are not two distinct acts but just 
one act, such that the direct act is a part of the reflex act, i.e., it is virtually 
contained in the reflex act. However, notice that, on this view, while a direct
act is a part of the reflex act, the converse is not true. Hence, it is no great 
mystery that a direct act might occur on its own without a reflex 
(discerning) act. Durand does not hold that the direct act and the reflex act 
are the same in a strict sense of identity, but rather that the direct act and 
reflex are one whole act.38
But what explains the fact that we discern a mental act in one situation 
whereas in another situation we do not? Durand doesn’t say.39 Peter of 
Palude, who follows Durand on this quite closely, suggests that it is a 
function of the will. It is up to me to think about my thought about the rose 
if I want.40 Like Durand, Palude maintains that from the representation of an
act. However, what is important is that a mental act’s being cognized is not 
the same as a mental act’s being introspectively conscious. I would like to 
thank Susan Brower-Toland for discussion about this point.
38 Hence, Durand’s view should not only be sharply contrasted with same-
order theories that maintain a strict identity between direct and reflex acts, 
but also those which maintain that the reflex act is somehow a part of the 
direct act. On such views, see Kriegel, “The Same-Order Monitoring Theory 
of Consciousness.”
39 Unfortunately, Durand only talks about discernment in one other place of 
which I am aware, namely, Sent. C 1.27.2, n. 21; however, in his discussion 
of fruition (Sent. 1.1.1) he characterizes the same phenomenon using the 
verb perpendere (n. 21: neque enim omni modo est perfecta cognitio qua 
quis cognoscit rem aliquam per actum rectum nisi perpendat se cognoscere 
eam, quod fit per actum reflexum.) See also n. 22.
40 Quodl. q. 6, f. 103rb-va: “[…] quia intelligimus cum volumus, intellectus 
inquirens cognoscere rem exteriorem tantum <et> non actum suum non est
dispositus ad recipiendum actum reflexum, si differt, vel rectum ut reflexus 
est, si non differt; unde tunc non recipit ipsum. Sed postea, volens [autem] 
scire actum suum et animam, quasi excitatus ad actionem circa hoc per 
ipsam attentionem, disponitur ad actum reflexum recipiendum. Sicut: homo 
external object, e.g., the rose, I can think, with one and the same thought, 
about whatever it is to which that object is related, e.g., about fire from the 
representation of smoke through smoke’s relation (of causality) to fire as a 
cognitive means, or, in the case at hand, about the (direct) act itself from 
the representation of the rose through the rose’s relation (of being-thought-
about) to that act.41 It is up to me to think about just the rose on its own, or, 
if I want, to go on and think about whatever it is that the rose might be 
related to. Nor does this entail that there will be two simultaneous 
intellective acts, one of which causes (excites) me to want to discern my 
thought and the other of which is the reflex (discerning) act itself by which I
discern my thought, for, at least according to Palude, the former can 
execute its role as exciting cause without having to be present at the same 
time as the latter.42
4. Conclusion
Let us sum up. According to Durand, a given mental power (the intellect, 
say) cannot elicit or have two mental acts at the same time. It follows, then, 
that mental reflection properly so-called — when I think that I am thinking 
about the wine in front of me — cannot be a matter of my intellect’s 
possession of two mental acts, one of which (the reflex act) is a higher-order
quandoque intelligit in universali asinum et nullum asinum in particulari, 
quod est possibile cum omne universale possit absolvi ab omni particulari. 
Postea vero simul cum asino in universali intelligit hunc asinum in 
particulari <intelligit eum> sine hoc quod accipiat novum phantasma sed 
<intelligit eum> per idem (novum MS) phantasma huiusmodi asini quod 
prius habebat, quod prius repraesentabat universale et movebat 
<intellectum> ad cognoscendum ille <universale> tantum, nunc vero 
movet ad <cognoscendum> utrumque [nunc vero movet ad utrumque] — 
non propter variationem sui <sc. phantasmatis> sed intellectus vel 
voluntatis quaerentis cognoscere nunc utrumque prius autem alterum 
tantum.” See also ibid., ff. 104ra, 118rb.
41 Quodl. q. 6, f. 118ra: “[…] si ex uno phantasmate possint plura cognosci, 
puta ex phantasmate fumi <possint cognosci> natura eius et ignis, et non 
curet homo nec cogitet de igne nec confuse nec aliter, occurrit sibi 
phantasma fumi ut repraesentans fumum; postea vero si sollicitetur aliquo 
excitante (excitate MS) interius vel exterius inquirere ulterius, cessabit 
actus primus et succedet secundus, <sed> per idem phantasma quoad 
speciem phantasticam <ut> repraesentantem (repraesentans MS) fumum et
ignem.”
42 Quodl. q. 6, f. 118ra: “Et licet ad intelligendum se intelligere de novo forte
requiratur aliqua intellectio excitativa attentionis, ipsa tamen non est causa 
directa actus reflexi.”
act of or about the other (the direct act). Rather, what happens is this. I 
elicit one mental act which has as its primary object the wine in front of me 
through which, as a cognitive means, I also cognize that very mental act 
itself as secondary object at the same time. The unity-of-act argument 
demands this: in order to judge that the wine in front of me is now being 
thought about by a mental act, I must elicit one mental act that has as its 
content the wine in front of me, the relation it stands in to a mental act, and
that very mental act itself. Nor does such a view fall into the trap of making 
introspective state consciousness ubiquitous, for I can attend to just the 
wine in front of me, or I can attend to the wine in front of me together with 
whatever else it might be related to, including, of course, my mental act 
about it.43
43I would like to thank Thomas Jeschke and Guy Guldentops for providing 
me with drafts of their editions of certain questions from Durand’s 
Sentences. As well, I would like to thank the audiences at the St.-Louis 
Medieval Symposium 2019 and the Loyola Chicago - St.-Louis University 
Medieval Research Group 2019.  Particular thanks are owed to Susan 
Brower-Toland, Charles Girard, Zita Toth, Deni Gamboa, Adam Wood, 
Martin Klein, Russell Friedman, and an anonymous referee for extremely 
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